青年哲学家工作坊第28期
题目
Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation
报告人
Michael Hannon
(University of Nottingham)
时间
3/15/2021
晚上6:30－8:30
腾讯会议ID
374 313 230
报告简介
In contemporary epistemology, fallibilism and skepticism are often depicted as opposing views: we embrace fallibilism to escape skepticism, and to deny fallibilism is to risk skepticism. However, fallibilism alone does not guarantee that most of our ordinary knowledge claims are true. In this talk, I will defend a version of skepticism that is compatible with fallibilism and supported by recent work in psychology. In particular, I will argue that we often cannot properly trust our ability to rationally evaluate reasons, arguments, and evidence (a fundamental knowledge-seeking faculty). We humans are just too cognitively impaired to achieve even fallible knowledge, at least for many beliefs.
报告人简介
Michael Hannon，剑桥大学哲学博士，福特汉姆大学哲学博士后，诺丁汉大学助理教授，主要研究知识论和政治哲学，曾获British Academy Rising Star Award。他在国际著名哲学期刊发表论文多篇，著有What's the Point of Knowledge?（Oxford）一书，与他人合编Political Epistemology和The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology两本文集。
往期工作坊信息参见
https://xingminghu.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wfyp/
