讲座预告|Max Lewis：Epistemic Blame: A Neo-Strawsonian Account

报告人：Max Lewis (University of Helsinki)

时间：2022年3月7日周一  晚上8:00—9:30

腾讯会议 ID：585-724-933 

地点：哲学系218

讲座摘要

On the one hand, epistemic blame is a familiar phenomenon. We epistemically blame wishful thinkers and dogmatists for their beliefs, careless students for their hasty reasoning, and politicians for their baseless assertions. On the other hand, it is difficult to pin down exactly what epistemic blame consists in and how it differs from other kinds of blame. Recently, epistemologists have begun to develop accounts of epistemic blame in ways that distinguish it from moral blame. I argue that extant accounts of epistemic blame fail to satisfy key desiderata for an account of epistemic blame. I then develop and defend a neo-Strawsonian account of epistemic blame. According to this account, epistemically blaming A for φ-ing centrally involves being disposed to have a range of negative non-cognitive responses and reducing one’s epistemic goodwill toward A. What makes it fitting to epistemically blame a person for φ-ing, on this account, is a matter of whether they manifested a sufficient degree of regard for epistemic values (e.g., true belief, knowledge, or understanding). I argue that my account not only allows for a unified picture of different kinds of blame but also uniquely satisfies all the key desiderata for an account of epistemic blame.

报告人简介

Max Lewis，Helsinki大学博士后，宾夕法尼亚大学哲学博士，主要研究伦理学与知识论，在Canadian Journal of Philosophy，Philosophical Studies等期刊发表论文多篇。

（转自“南京大学哲学系”微信公众号）