讲座人：奥拉夫 • 阿斯海姆（Olav Asheim）（挪威奥斯陆大学哲学系教授）
主持人：张建军（南京大学哲学系教授、逻辑所所长）
讲座一：Reference, Intentionality, and Purely Intentional Objects
（指称、意向性与纯粹意向对象）
地点：仙林校区哲学系（薛光林楼）401报告厅
时间：2015年4月14日（周二）晚7：00
讲座二：Can a Belief Ever Be About an Object Directly?
（直接关于对象的信念何以可能）
地点：仙林校区哲学系（薛光林楼）314会议室
时间：2015年4月15日（周三）晚7：00
（英语演讲）
欢迎师生出席！
南京大学哲学系/南京大学现代逻辑与逻辑应用研究所
报告人简介：Olav Asheim，现任挪威奥斯陆大学哲学系教授。先后在挪威奥斯陆大学获得学士与哲学博士学位，师从著名分析哲学家和现象学家达格芬•佛莱斯达尔。长期致力于哲学逻辑与逻辑哲学、语言哲学研究。著有《指称与意向性》（中译本由南京大学出版社2014年出版）、《索引词与直接指称》、《作为双命题态度的愿望》、《真理与视域》、《模糊对象与模糊逻辑》等，近年亦致力于“计算机博弈哲学研究”，是奥斯陆大学跨学科研究团队负责人。2014年在南大讲学期间，受聘南大现代逻辑与逻辑应用研究所兼职研究员。
代表作《指称与意向性》简介：指称（reference）理论是当代逻辑哲学、语言哲学、心灵哲学领域共同关心的重要话题。《指称与意向性》一书将现代模态逻辑与现代哲学的意向性理论相结合，对指称理论的主要流派进行了深入系统的比较研究；运用克里普克与弗莱斯达尔的模态论证系统批判了奎因的谓词首位思想，证立了非变元的“真正指称词项”及与之相应的逻辑单称思想的不可归约性；对以往学界广为指认的“指代词”和“指称性摹状词”作为真正指称词项的资质给予了否定性解答；对在专名理论上长期对峙的描述论与直接指称论两大流派的成就与困境进行了精湛分析与阐释，否决了双方关于“真正指称词项必无含义”的共同预设；提出了“作为意向关系的指称”的新理论，论证了“纯粹意向对象”的存在及其解题功能，显示了开拓两大流派之外的“第三条道路”的必要与可能。本书是运用现代逻辑工具分析与解决哲学论争的一部典范之作。
讲座一摘要：
ABSTRACT
There seems to be an important difference between the following two belief reports, the first one often called “de dicto”, and the second “de re”:
(1) Peter believes that someone has stolen his bicycle.
(2) There is someone Peter believes has stolen his bicycle.
However, in (2) we quantify into a belief context, something which is very problematic.
There are two big obstacles to quantifying into belief and other attitude contexts. One of them is that coreferential terms cannot be substituted for each other in such contexts without the risk of turning truths into falsities, the problem of substitutivity. The other obstacle is that the object a belief or other attitude is directed at may not exist, the problem of possible reference failure. In my book Reference and Intentionality I have proposed solutions to both problems. The topic of this talk is the second problem. My solution to the problem of possible reference failure is to recognize purely intentional objects, objects that can be identified only by their intentional properties, i.e. the properties they have in virtue of being objects of intentional acts and attitudes. I shall show that there is no problem with referring to and quantifying over such objects even when they are said not to be non-existent, and explain what it means for a purely intentional object not to exist.
讲座二摘要：
ABSTRACT
Our intuition tells us that some of our beliefs are about objects directly, while other beliefs may be said to concern particular objects if they are true, but if they are false, there may be no objects in particular they are false about. The difference is well illustrated by Quine's classic example:
(1) Ralph believes that the man in brown hat is a spy.
(2) Ralph believes that the shortest spy is a spy.
Here (1) seems to report a belief that is directly about a particular person, whereas(2) reports a belief that concerns a particular person if it is true that there is a shortest spy. But this intuition should perhaps not be trusted, for in Quine's example the man in brown hat = B. J. Ortcutt, and Ralph does not believe that Ortcutt is a spy. That shows that coreferential terms cannot be substituted for each other in belief contexts without the risk of turning truth into falsehood. In my talk, I discuss this problem and propose a solution to it.